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The undermining of a 
national myth 
the Treaty ofWaitangi 1970 -1990 
WILLIAM RENWICK 
The Treaty ofWaitangi is having a second coming, 
one in which Maori understandings of its signifi-
cance are as important as those of Pakeha. An 
earlier myth of the Treaty has been found, like the 
emperor, to be without clothes. The arguments 
and confusions of the last twenty years are signs 
that New Zealanders are beginning to develop a 
post-colonial mentality. 
During those years two very different aspira-
tions collided. One was predominantly Pakeha, 
the other pre-
d o mina n tl y ir• '«:~~~'f"':~,f· 
Maori. The first 
was a search for 
totems of New 
Zealand's na-
tional identity. 
The second was 
a determination 
to have the 
Treaty h on-
oured in terms 
of Maori under-
standings of the 
duties it im-
p osed on the 
Crown. Both as-
pira tions fo -
cused on Wai-
tangi. But where, for purposes of national symbol-
ism, the Pakeha interest centred on the event that 
was the founding act of a new nation, the Maori 
interest was in recapturing what had actually 
been transacted between Maori rangatira on the 
one side and Queen Victoria's consul on the other. 
For Maori, as for Pakeha, the signing of the treaty 
Above: The Challenge: the opening ceremony of the 1990 
Commonwealth Games, Auckland. [Courtesy, New Zea-
land Herald] 
was a solemn event and Waitangi a revered place. 
But Maori also had a consuming interest in what 
the Treaty signified, particularly in its Maori ver-
sion. To most Pakeha the Treaty itself was a closed 
book. Few had read it. Fewer knew that it existed 
in a Maori as well as an English text. 
Maori leaders had been as enthusiastic as Pakeha 
in their efforts to make Waitangi the symbol of 
nationhood. Sir Apirana Ngata was a foundation 
member of the Waitangi Trust Board. He master-
minded the building of the magnificent carved 
meeting house -
Te Tiriti o Wai-
tangi - to stand 
beside the Treaty 
House and give 
symbolic expres-
sion to Ma ori 
standing side by 
side with Pake-
ha. It was opened 
during centen-
nial festivities at 
Waitangiin 1940 
a t which Maori 
tribes played a 
prominent part. 
And it was large-
ly through the 
initiatives of 
Maori members of Parliament that 6 February, 
New Zealand's national day, was given the status 
of a public holiday in 1973. 
Maori aspirations coincided with other stirrings 
for overt expressions of a growing sense of na-
tional identity. With the end of empires, many new 
nations had emerged after the Second World War. 
New Zealanders came to think of themselves less 
in their imperial relationship with Britain and 
more in terms of their own national identity. But 
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they did not have a national day. New Zealanders 
living abroad became particularly aware of this. 
There was only one day that would fill the void: the 
anniversaryofthesigningoftheTreatyofWaitangi. 
There were some matters of emphasis on which 
Labour and National politicians differed but there 
was a central core of sentiment which they shared. 
They saw the Treaty as the founding act of a new 
nation in which two peoples from widely differing 
cultural backgrounds were working out their des-
tiny together. In signing the Treaty, Maori had 
ceded their collective powers of sovereignty to 
Queen Victoria. In return, they had been guaran-
teed protec-
tions for their 
lands and the 
rights and pri-
vileges of Brit-
ish subjects. 
This was a 
unique histori-
cal transac-
tion . made pos-
sible by British 
huma nitaria n 
concern. In the 
course of more 
than a century 
there had been 
tensions and 
misunderstandings, and Maori interests had not 
always been adequately protected. But these were 
n ot of the ess ence of the unfolding relationship . 
What stood out was the commitment to racial 
equality - legal, political and social - and the 
extent to which Maori had benefited from it. As a 
result two peoples were merging into one nation. 
New Zealand was an example to the rest of the 
world of good race relations. The standard con-
trast was with apartheid in SouthMrica. The Hon. 
R.M. Algie, for example, expressed views which 
were widely shared in the 60s when, referring to 
Maori, he said: 'Let them grow up with us, as part 
of us. That is what the Treaty was aimed at. That 
is what we would celebrate if we had a day of 
thanksgiving. And what we are all looking forward 
to is the building of a New Zealand race, a fusion 
ofMaori and European, with no distinction what-
soever, with everything open to ea ch according to 
his ability'. 
The ethnocentrism of this view was seldom 
noticed at the time. Pakeha ways of doing things 
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set the norms for Maori as well as Pakeha. Not 
stated, but clearly implied, was the assumption 
that all the benefits flowed one way. That, in 
Pakeha rhetoric, was what the Treaty made pos-
sible. There was no acknowledgement that it was 
through the Treaty that British settlers were given 
the right to be in New Zealand. From soon after it 
was signed the Treaty had been dubbed the Magna 
Carta of the Maori people. Lindsay Buick used the 
phrase approvingly in his book Tile Treaty of 
Waitangi and it became a regular feature of 
Waitangi rhetoric. Sir Apirana Ngata tried to cor-
rect the record by referring to the Treaty as the 
Magna Carta of 
New Zealand, 
but the view 
that took hold 
in the Pakeha 
mind was that 
Maori were the 
beneficia ries . 
The concep-
tual framework 
within which 
the Treaty was 
discu ssed h ad 
been put t o -
gether by Pake-
h a scholars 
and commen-
tators and had provided taken-for-granted views 
which were regularly expressed by public figures. 
Furthermore, when politicians, Maori as well as 
Pakeha, referred to the Treaty it was to the English 
text. When the Waitangi Day Act 1960 was passed, 
a copy of the Treaty was printed with it, but only 
in the English version. In 1971 Matiu Rata pro-
posed, as a Private Member Bill, the New Zealand 
Day Bill, with the aim of legislating for a public 
holiday. He attached the Treaty to his Bill but, 
again, only in the English version. When, in 1973, 
as a minister in the third Labour government, he 
was successful in getting his New Zealand Day Act 
passed, the schedule to that Act s till included only 
the English text of the Treaty. It was not until he 
piloted the Treaty ofWaitangi Act throu gh Parlia -
Above: Marcus King's impression, painted in 1940, of 
the signing of the Treaty ofWaitangL [Courtesy, Alexan-
der TtunbuU Ubrary] 
Opposite: The Busby House a t Waitangi before restora-
tion [Courtesy, Auckland Institute and Museum Ref 
Cl803] 
ment in 1975 that the Maori version of the Treaty 
appeared in its schedule with the English text. 
Even then, the Maori text was discovered to have 
a serious omission and spelling errors. 
So the mind-set that surrounded discussions 
of the Treaty in the Pakeha world until the early 
seventies was one that had been formed from 
readings of the English text. The Maori version 
had disappeared from Pakeha sight. It was not 
thought to raise any important problems of inter-
pretation. Buick had apparently put any doubts 
to rest in 1914 when, referring to the Maori 
version of the English text, he wrote: '(T]he excel-
lence ofits ren-
dering may be 
judged from 
the fact that 
though it has 
been tried 
many times by 
the most ac-
complished of 
Maori schol-
ars, the trans-
lation has 
never been 
shaken, and 
stands today a 
perfect native 
reflex of the 
European mind conveying in all probability a 
clearer view to the Maori of what the Maori meant 
than the English version has done to the average 
Pakeha'. 
It was not until 1972 that Ruth Ross chal-
lenged that comfortable conclusion in a seminal 
essay which analysed the way the English and 
Maori versions of the Treaty had been c\tafted. 
Much that had previously been taken on trust, 
and particularly the relationship between the 
Maori and English texts, became problematic. 
And by 1972 a Maori protest movement had 
emerged which was making disturbing assertions 
about the Treaty. Wall graffiti announced: The 
Treaty is a Fraud'. 
By 1970 Maoridom was responding to transfor-
mations that had gathered pace during the fifties 
and sixties. From being predominantly rural, the 
Maori population was rapidly becoming urban-
ised, with increasing numbers concentrated in 
parts of Auckland and Wellington, the two main 
cities. It was also heavily weighted to the under-
fifteen age groups. Increasing numbers of young 
Maori were coping with urban living. 
There was a widespread Pakeha perception 
that the country had a 'Maori problem'. To people 
who prided themselves that they lived in a society 
with exemplary race relations, this was an unwel-
come discovery. In 1960, the Hunn report had for 
the frrst time documented Maori inequalities in 
income, health, housing and education. A decade 
later these inequalities were widening and more 
Maori were experiencing them. Maori men and 
youths were also being convicted for crimes and 
imprisoned out 
of all proportion 
to their num-
bers in the total 
population. The 
frrst street bat-
tles between 
urban gangs 
had erupted, 
and the public 
was trying to 
fathom what 
the future 
would hold if 
the wild young 
men who were 
members of the 
Storm Troopers, Black Power, Mongrel Mob, and 
other gangs with equally frightening names, were 
allowed to rampage. The public rhetoric of ·one 
people' was becoming difficult to believe. 
Nor were New Zealanders able to deal with 
these concerns in isolation from the rest of the 
world. Television had come to New Zealand in 
1960. Maori as well as Pakeha viewers watched 
the unfolding drama of the American civil rights 
movements. Freedom marches, teach-ins, public 
demonstrations, and politically motivated epi-
sodes of civil disobedience became familiar view-
ing. These techniques were used in New Zealand 
in the sixties in protest movements against the 
Vietnam War and sporting contacts with South 
Mrica. All that was needed were leaders who were 
able to exploit television to rivet public attention 
on their discontents. And by 1970 there were 
activist leaders who were ready to make their 
challenge. Some, such as Whina Cooper and Eva 
Rickard were already acknowledged leaders who 
drew their authority from their tribal groups. But 
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most were from the small but groWing number of 
well educated, articulate younger Maori. 
One who has played a pivotal role during the 
last twenty years is Dr. Ranginui Walker. In 1970 
he was appointed to the staff of University of 
Auckland and to the Auckland District Maori 
Council. He was in his early 40s, and the changes 
that these appointments made to the course of his 
life are typical of the personal experience of a great 
many Maori during the same years. 'By education 
and training', Dr Walker has recently written, 'I 
was an upwardly mobile member of mainstream 
society. I held conservative views, I had security 
and a comfort-
able life . My 
only ambition 
was to do well 
in my profes-
sion and to 
benefit my 
family. I was 
a n intensely 
s hy and pri-
vate person 
with no aspi-
rations to poli-
tics or public 
life. But I was 
also Maori. I 
inhabited a 
dual world of two social and cultural landscapes. 
As long as those two landscapes were kept dis-
crete, I could shuttle back and forth between the 
two with ease as a bicultural person. For the first 
twenty years my career goals were achieved on 
schedule. Then, in 1970, my life changed as 
career and community involvements put me at the 
interface of cultural politics between Maori and 
Pakeha' . 
In 1970 a disquieted New Zealand Maori Coun-
ell decided to bring Maori leaders together to 
exchange views with younger Maori about the 
problems of urban living. Ranginui Walker organ-
ised the Young Maori Leaders Conference at the 
University of Auckland. It was widely representa-
tive ofMaori organisations. It endorsed a compre-
hensive set of recommendations which became 
central to all later Maori political activity. Even 
more important, it sparked the formation of Nga 
Tamatoa, the young warriors, an activist group 
which vigorously set out to protest Maori con-
cerns. It made cogent, hard-hitting submissions 
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to Parliamentary select committees. It campaigned 
successfully for the introduction of annual Maori 
language weeks into the education system to 
heighten public awareness. But its name, its 
reminder of the Maori fighting warriors of the 
nineteenth century, and its public activities were 
deeply disturbing to most Pakeha. Nga Tamatoa 
and other Maori protest groups used wall slogans, 
bumper stickers, sit-ins, street marches, and well 
advertised confrontations at public events to pub-
licise their radical message. Their language was 
deliberately inflammatory, and, like Pakeha activ-
ists, they carried civil disobedience to the limit of 
the law on occa-
sion. But the 
modern Maori 
protest move-
ment kept with-
in the late nine-
teenth century 
Maori tradition 
of non-violent 
opposition, so 
Armed struggle 
was ruled out. 
The Maori 
land march of 
1975, led by 
Whina Cooper 
was for the 
Pakeha a prolonged, bewildering media event. It 
started at Te Hapua with fifteen people and ended 
in Parliament grounds a month later with 3000 
marching behind the banner 'Not one more acre of 
Maori land'. It was a dignified demonstration of 
Maori frustration and anger. The problem it posed 
for the sympathetic Pakeha was: What could be 
done ~bout it 135 years after the signing of the 
Treaty? 
Land grievances continued to claim media 
attention, especially the occupation of Bastion 
Point which lasted 506 days during 1978-79 and 
was ended by police force . But the annually 
recurring focus of protest became Waitangi Day 
and the Treaty grounds. The third Labour govern-
ment had unwittingly provided a perfect target for 
activists when it passed the New Zealand Day Act 
Above: Te Tiriti o Waita.ngi House and stone monument 
built at Te Tii marae in 1881.[Cowtesy, Auckland Insti-
tute and Museum) 
Opposite: Waitangi in 1912. [Cowtesy, Auckland Insti· 
tute and Museum} 
in 1973. Waitangi Day became New Zealand's 
national day, a public holiday and a day of cel-
ebration and thanksgiving. Annual national day 
ceremonies were held on the historic lawn at 
Waitangi, one in the morning, the other at dusk, 
both of them televised to the nation. The third 
National government restored the name Waitangi 
Day for these celebrations in 1976, once again 
emphasising the historic connection between the 
signing of the Treaty and New Zealanders' sense of 
their national identity. Waitangi Day became the 
occasion of mounting protest, at first to brand the 
Treaty a fraud but later to urge that it be hon-
oured. 
Nor was the 
protest move-
ment confmed to 
Maori activist or-
ganisations. Op-
position to the 
shameful Spring-
bok rugby tour of 
1981 brought to-
gether a broad 
spectrum of New 
Zealanders, Pake-
ha as well as 
Maori, opposed to 
racism. New Zea-
landers had never 
been so bitterly divided. When the tour ended, the 
organisations that led the protest, HARf and 
ACORD, switched their attention from sporting 
contacts with South Africa to Maori rights under 
the Treaty. More important, the main church 
denominations, whose spiritual leaders blessed 
the formal Waitangi Day ceremonies at Waitangi 
itself, had become uncomfortable. Their voices 
were joined to those who were publicly searching 
for ways of honouring the Treaty. Among the 
established leadership in Maoridom, too, there 
were similar moves. After a decade of debate on 
marae through the country, tribal elders had 
separated what their younger kin were saying 
from the ways they often went about publicising it. 
After much debate, the New Zealand Maori Coun-
cil produced its Kaupapa on the Treaty in 1983. 
Each year from 1980 to 1985 the Waitangi Day 
ceremonies were tense and confrontational. Most 
Pakeha were dismayed by the visible evidence of 
discord and anger. Many Maori elders grieved 
when the mana of the sacred ground ofWaitangi 
was trampled on. The country seemed to be locked 
into an armual ceremony that pitted New Zealand-
ers against each other when it should be bringing 
them together. 
When Labour returned to power in 1984 it 
decided to shift the oficial national day ceremony 
away from Waitangi. The main ceremonies in 
1986-9 were held in the banquet room of the 
Beehive, the centre of executive government in 
Wellington. Annual ceremonies continued at Wai-
tangi. but as a scaled-down, local affair. It was a 
policy of retreat. Had it not been associated during 
the same years with substantive changes in the 
way the Gov-
ernment, the 
courts, and 
Parliament 
were dealing 
with issues 
relating to 
Maori rights 
under the 
Treaty, it 
would not 
have defused 
the protest 
activity that 
had come to 
be associated 
with Waitan-
gi Day. Protests continued, but in a lower key. 
Instead of protesting, Maori found themselves 
more often advocating and negotiating. This took 
them off the streets and away from television 
cameras, and into the Waitangi Tribunal, court 
rooms. the committee rooms of Parliament, and 
the offices of Ministers of the Crown. As this 
happened the initiative passed from activist lead-
ers to the tribal leaders of Maoridom. Both, how-
ever, were united in insisting on Treaty rights 
guaranteed to them as tangata whenua, the origi-
nal people of the land. 
Then, amid much apprehension, and as the 
only appropriate way of commemorating the 150th 
anniversary of the Treaty, the Government de-
cided to return to Waitangi for the official 1990 
festivities . Queen Elizabeth II was present for the 
occasion. She came to Waitangi as the great-great 
grand daughter of Queen Victoria, on whose be-
half the Treaty had been entered into. She had 
asked that descendents of Maori rangatira who 
had signed the Treaty be present, too, and she 
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held a reception for them. It was an historic 
moment. New Zealanders were greatly relieved 
when, except for one incident, protest activity was 
orderly and not overtly disruptive. Indeed, the 
voice of protest became part of the ceremony itself 
through the address of the Anglican Bishop of 
Aotearoa, Whakahuihui Vercoe. 
For his address before the Queen of New Zea-
land and the head of the Anglican community, 
Bishop Vercoe took his text from Psalms 137: 'By 
the waters ofBabylon we sat down. There we wept 
when we remembered Zion'. 'Some of us have 
come here to celebrate', he said, 'some to com-
memorate, 
some to com-
miserate, but 
some to remem-
ber that the 
treaty was a 
compact be-
tween two peo-
ple. But since 
the signing of 
that treaty you 
have margina-
lised us. You 
have not hon-
oured the 
treaty. We have 
not honoured 
each other in 
the promises 
we made on this sacred ground. Since 1840 the 
partner that has been marginalised is me - the 
language of this land is yours, the customs are 
yours, the media by which we tell the world who 
we are are yours'. 
For those who, over the years, spoke for the 
Crown as the other treaty partner there had also 
been decisive changes of sentiment. As recently as 
1978, in his Waitangi Day statement the Governor 
General, Sir Keith Holyoake, had said: The real 
significance ofWaitangi Day lies, not so much in 
its commemoration of the declaration of British 
Sovereignty ... as in its symbolising of the equality 
between Maori and Pakeha being side by side, 
with each respecting the contribution the other is 
making to the enrichment of our nation ... Captain 
Hobson's historic statement: "He iwi tahi tatoul" 
(We are all one people) stressed the symbolic 
significance of the treaty .. . The best way to 
accomplish [He iwi tahi tatou] is to eliminate any 
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form of distinction between Maori and Pakeha -
without depriVing any group of its culture. Citi-
zens of our country' should not be described as 
being Maoris, Pakehas, Islanders or Britons. Citi-
zens of this beautiful country are all New Zealand-
ers.' 
But by 1981, the next Governor General, Sir 
David Beattie broke the tradition of such state-
ments. 'I am of the view', he said, 'that we are not 
one people, despite Hobson's oft-quoted words, 
nor should we try to be. We do not need to be'. His 
successor. The Most Rev. Sir Paul Reeves, was the 
first person ofMaori descent to become Governor 
General, and 
his under-
standing of the 
Treaty com-
bined Maori 
and Pakeha 
perspectives. In 
his speech on 
Waitangi Day 
1987, for exam-
ple, he said: Te 
Tiriti o Waitangi 
has given us a 
framework for 
this nation, a 
framework in 
which two cul-
tures struggle to 
grow and de-
velop. So whether we like it or not, the Treaty 
belongs to the heritage of all New Zealanders ... 
Maoris must be able to develop their culture and 
institutions just as non-Maoris have done, and to 
use the resources of the nation for that purpose'. 
And Queen Elizabeth II, in her speech at the 
150th anniversary. gave the weight of her sym-
bolic authority to a positive, forward-looking view 
of the Treaty. Today'. she said, 'we are strong 
enough and honest enough to learn the lesson of 
the last 150 years and to admit that the treaty has 
been imperfectly observed. I look upon it as a 
legacy of promise. It can be a guide to all New 
Zealanders of goodwill, to all those whose collec-
tive sense of justice, fairness and tolerance will 
Above: Haka party at the centennial celebrations at 
Wait.angi. [Cow'tesy, Alexander'fumbuliUbrary Ref No. 
4510] 
Opposite: The occupation of Bastion Point, January, 
1977. [Cow'tesy, New Zealand Herald/ 
shape our future. Your Court of Appeal has de-
clared that the obligation on treaty partners is to 
show each other the utmost good faith' . 
The Queen's reference to the Court of Appeal was 
a word to the knowing. In June 1987 the Court 
had handed down its decision in New Zealand 
Maori Council v. Attorney General. It was a land-
mark decision, arguably the most important court 
decision this century. It was the first of what has 
become a series of declarations on Maori Treaty 
rights under statute law in New Zealand. These 
decisions are legitimating a radically new way of 
looking at the 
Treaty. They 
are an out-
come of the 
Treaty ofWai-
tangi Act of 
1975, and the 
reports of the 
Waitangi Tri-
bunal it au-
thorised. 
The Wai -
tangi Tribunal 
was the fruit 
of the Hon . 
Matiu Rata's 
efforts. He had 
two objectives associated with the Treaty. When 
he became Minister of Maori Affairs in the third 
Labour Government (1972-75) he achieved one 
and laid foundations for the other. The New Zea-
land Day Act 1974 enshrined Waitangi Day by 
making it New Zealand's national day and focus-
ing annual celebrations on Waitangi as the cradle 
of the nation. His other objective was to find a way 
of giving the Treaty authoritative standing in New 
Zealand law. As he saw it, these two changes, if 
taken together, would reinforce each other. One 
would strengthen the emerging sense of national 
identity. The other would make it better informed 
by having the nation face up to Maori grievances 
which for some tribes had been smouldering for 
nearly a century and a half. 
TheTreatyofWaitangiAct 1975was the result. 
It provided for the 'observance and confirmation of 
the Treaty of Waitangi" and established the 
Waitangi Tribunal to investigate claims brought 
by Maori who considered they had been prejudi-
cially affected by actions - or lack of action - by the 
Crown that were inconsistent with the principles 
of the Treaty. The tribunal was to have regard to 
both the Maort and English texts and to differ-
ences between them, and "determine the meaning 
and effect" of principles it deduced from them. 
Unlike other tribunals, however, the Waitangi 
Tribunal would make recommendations, not bind-
ing decisions. Nor was it (at first) given retrospec-
tive powers. It was to deal with grievances against 
the Crown after 10 October 1975, when the Act 
came into force. 
The Waitangi Tribunal came into being almost 
without notice and it was given, at best, a tepid 
reception by 
Maori leaders. It 
was slow to get 
started, and its 
first hearings 
gave no hint of 
what was to fol-
low. It was not 
until March 
1983, when its 
Motunui report 
was made pub-
lic, thatevenwell 
informed New 
Zealanders 
knew of its ex-
istence or what 
it had been set up to do. Since then it has been at 
the very heart of all public debate about Treaty 
issues. Its contribution has been essentially con-
ceptual. The intellectual revolution New Zealand-
ers are living through would not have happened 
were it not for the explanations and interpreta-
tions of the Tribunal's reports. The practical im-
plications are enormous. 
In the Tribunal's explanations, the Treaty is 
first and foremost a contract entered into by two 
sovereign entities. It is thus to be interpreted in 
ways appropriate to treaties between independent 
states. It is a treaty between a European nation 
and the leaders of an indigenous people and, 
unusually, it exists in the languages of the two 
parties. It was entered into in good faith on both 
sides, and both expected to benefit from it. 'It 
made us one country', the Tribunal said in its 
Motunui Report, 'but acknowledged that we were 
two people'. There was an exchange of gifts. Maori 
ceded to the Crown a right to govem in the 
expectation that they would no longer be harried 
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by unruly Pakeha or marauding trtbes. Pakeha 
were given the right to settle and, in retum, Maori 
had their property rights guaranteed, they re-
ceived the Crown's royal protection, and all the 
rights and privileges of British subjects. 
The Tribunal's task was made vastly more 
difficult in 1985 when the fourth Labour govem-
ment ( 1984-90) extended its jurisdiction to claims 
dating back to the signing of the Treaty itself. All 
its reports tum on the continuing tension be-
tween sovereignty and te tino rangatiratanga. lf 
these are to be resolved, new ground rules must be 
established for relations between the Crown and 
its Treaty part-
ner. It is only 
in the spirit of 
the Treaty it-
self, the Tribu-
nal believes, 
that workable 
answers can be 
found to what 
in terms of ab-
stract principle 
can be irrecon-
cilable issues. 
The two peo-
ples entered 
into a partner-
ship in 1840, 
and it is in the 
spirit of part-
nership that they must now shape a shared 
future. For there are limits to the practical solu-
tions now available to resolve grievances, particu-
larly so for grievances over the loss of trtballand 
and other natural resources. The Tribunal has 
laid it down as a working rule that the resolution 
of one injustice should not create another. These 
readings of the Treaty were made public between 
March 1983 and July 1985 in the Tribunal's 
Motunui, Kaituna and Manukau reports . 
All New Zealand govemments since the early 
1970s have struggled against adverse, and wors-
ening, economic circumstances. The fourth La-
bour govemment took a radical approach to the 
role of Govemment itself, and devolved on to 
public companies a number of activities previ-
ously administered by Ministers and public serv-
ants. The State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 
authorised these changes. lncluded among the 
assets to be made over to public companies were 
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lands, forests and waterways that were, or could 
be, subject to Maori claims before the Waitangi 
Tribunal. The Act recognised these claims and 
contained a clause which said: 'Nothing in this 
Act shall permit the Crown to act in a manner that 
is inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi'. But the New Zealand Maori Council 
was not convinced that the detailed provisions of 
the Act fully protected Maori rights and fl.l.ed a 
case asking the courts to make a declaratory 
judgement on the meaning of the Act. The Court 
of Appeal's decision in June 1987 confirmed the 
Maori Council's doubts. It also gave its authorita-
t 
tive interpreta-
tion of the prin-
ciples of the 
Treaty and what 
they imply as 
duties for the 
Crown in its ad-
ministration of 
the State Owned 
Enterprises Act. 
That was the de-
cision alluded to 
by the Queen in 
her speech at the 
ceremony to 
mark the 150th 
anniversary of 
the signing of 
the Treaty. 
The Court of Appeal's obiter dicta in that and 
some later cases have transformed public discus-
sion of the meaning and significance of the Treaty 
ofWaitangi. This it has done first by upholding the 
interpretations of the Treaty made by the Waitangi 
Tribunal in its reports. People who were disposed 
to dismiss what the trtbunal had said had to take 
notice when essentially the same message was 
contained in the unanimous decision of five judges 
sitting in the highest court in the land. Secondly, 
the Court of Appeal has spelt out the duties that 
the signatories to the Treaty owe each other if its 
principles are to have continuing effect. Thirdly, 
the Court has left it open for Maori to retum to the 
Court if further questions about the meaning of 
the law arise where the Crown is required to act 
Above: Whina Cooper at Bastion Point, January, 1977. 
{Courtesy, New Zealand Herald] 
Opposite: Police removing protestors from Bastion Point, 
May 25, 1978. {Courtesy, New Zealand Herald} 
consistently with the principles of the Treaty. 
Governments have been pointedly reminded that 
they must act lawfully when they exercise the 
powers of the Crown on matters involving Maori 
rights under the Treaty. 
The Treaty. as the Court of Appeal reads it, is 
a solemn agreement between two parties. It was 
entered into in good faith and records the recipro-
cal obligations that were entered into. 'For its part 
the Crown sought legitimacy from the indigenous 
people for its acquisition of sovereignty and in 
return it gave certain guarantees'. The Treaty 
itself'has to be 
seen as an em-
bryo rather 
than a fully de-
veloped and in-
tegrated set of 
ideas'. It cre-
ated relation-
ships between 
the partners 
that are best 
thought of as 
'fiduciary' - of 
trustees who 
have the legal 
responsibility 
to act for oth-
ers to protect 
their interest. 
Oneofthepart-
ners, furthermore, is the Crown and in the way its 
agents carry out their duties under the Treaty. the 
honour of the Crown is always at stake. The duty 
of the Crown is not merely passive, but extends to 
active protection ofMaori people in the use of their 
lands and waters to the fullest extent practicable'. 
These words are full of implication. They are 
legal concepts that are part of the very fabric of 
judicial discourse in the courts of the English 
speaking world of which New Zealand is a mem-
ber. They reverse assumptions and arguments 
which during the previous llO years had dis-
missed the Treaty of Waitangi as a legal nullity. 
The Treaty is still not part of statute law but it is 
now being used as an aid to the interpretation of 
statute law. The Court had given legal meaning to 
the requirements of a statute to act consistently 
with the principles of the Treaty. In doing so it set 
standards that the Government would have great 
difficulty in applying steadily and consistently. 
Labour had taken the high moral ground at the 
1984 election. 'Ignorance and apathy', it said, 'by 
what may well be a majority should not deter or 
detain a proper solution' ofTreaty issues. What it 
did not bargain on was the extent to which its 
policies for honouring the Treaty and restructur-
ing the economy would conflict. Nor, apparently, 
had it foreseen the widespread unease and active 
hostility that its Treaty policies would provoke 
among the Pakeha majority. In contrast with the 
early 80s, when Maori were protesting against 
institutional oppression, it was Pakeha fears that 
dominated pub-
lic argument 
and sparked po-
litical responses 
in the second 
half of the dec-
ade. There was 
a widespread 
perception that 
the Govern-
ment was bow-
ing to demands 
that would lead 
to, if they were 
not based on, 
Maori separa-
tism. Policies 
that acknowl-
edge rights from 
which only 
Maori could benefit were attacked as reverse 
racism. They flew in the face of the central tenets 
ofPakeha egalitarian beliefs. Instead of being one 
people living under the same rule of law, all 
eligible for the same rights. distinctions based on 
the most dubious of all grounds- race or cultural 
identity - were setting Maori and Pakeha against 
each other. 
The Waitangi Tribunal's Mwiwhenua Fishing 
Report, published in June 1988, further inflamed 
these views. Instead of confirming the taken-for-
granted Pakeha assumption that the seas sur-
rounding New Zealand were the domain of the 
Crown out to the international limit, the Tribunal 
argued that Maori customary rights to the sea. 
declared by the Treaty and guaranteed under its 
protections, had never been extinguished. This 
was a startling conclusion and it was received 
with utter disbelief by most Pakeha. It pitted 
Maori Treaty rights against the nation's interest in 
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the fishing industry. No one could foresee the 
outcome, but the prospect of dividing fishing 
grounds on racial lines was deeply disquieting to 
a great many Pakeha, particularly those living in 
fishing communities. 
The 'one people' belief which most Pakeha 
thought to be inherent in the Treaty came to be 
used as an argument for dismissing the Treaty 
itself as of mere historical interest. The Opposition 
spokesperson on Maori affairs, Winston Peters, 
MP, argued that it was unrealistic for New Zea-
landers to try to live in an '1840s time warp'. 
Because the 
government had 
to pilot several 
pieces of legis-
lation through 
Parliament to 
enact its Treaty 
policy, there 
were numerous 
opportunities 
for fiery debate. 
Opinions dif-
fer on how well 
Labour deliv-
ered on its 
Treaty policy. 
Members of its 
cabinetandPar-
liamentarycau-
cus were clearly 
pulled in different directions in the confused, 
acrimonious public debate, but there can be no 
doubt that the years 1984-90 brought far-reach-
ing changes in the basic concepts in relation to 
which Crown policies on Treaty issues were formed 
and carried out. For the first time since 1840 a 
government set out to be responsive to the Maori 
as well as the English text of the Treaty, and, in the 
exercise of the powers of government it derived 
from article 1, to acknowledge the guarantee of 
rangatiratanga declared in article 2. 
It is too soon to say how far these initiatives will 
continue under the fourth National Government. 
The zeal with which some of its leading members 
harried the Labour Government gave grounds for 
thinking that National might want to halt or 
reverse the main changes that are now in train. 
But the mood of the country was quieter and more 
accepting on Treaty issues in 1990 than it had 
been during the previous five years. Public opin-
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ion surveys showed higher percentages of re-
spondents feeling favourably towards the Treaty. 
The National Party at its annual conference in 
July 1990 endorsed a Maori affairs policy which, 
among other things, 'would establish a national 
consensus on the future role of the treaty'. Na-
tional campaigned for the election in October 
1990 on a platform of bringing the country to-
gether again. On becoming Prime Minister, Rt. 
Hon. Jim Bolger vowed to practise 'the politics of 
inclusion', and in his speech at the 1991 Waitangi 
commemorative service he pledged his govern-
ment unequivo-
cally to the re-
dress of Maori 
grievances un-
der the Treaty. 
Matiu Rata's 
political intu-
itions are being 
confirmed. A 
more mature 
sense of na-
tional identity is 
to be achieved 
only by coming 
to terms with 
the previously 
hidden history 
of the Treaty 
and then set-
ting out on a 
new path that acknowledges the rights and inter-
ests of both Treaty partners. New Zealanders have 
entered a new era in their history: the Treaty is 
speaking in both languages. 
The changes New Zealanders are living through 
could not have entered their present constructive 
phase through the processes of cultural politics 
alone. Indeed, there were disturbing signs during 
the years 1980-84 that the Maori rights protest 
movement and the political establishment were in 
perpetual check to each other. What was needed 
were ideas and analyses capable of offering a 
context for the justifiable concerns of both Treaty 
partners to be approached from a new perspec-
Above: Protest activity increased in 1982. [Cow'tesy, 
New Zealand Herald/ 
Opposite: Police moving in on a home-made smoke 
bomb, February 6, 1982. [Courtesy, New Zealand Her-
ald] 
live. 
The Waitangi Tribunal was the institutional 
forum through which those reconciling ideas and 
analysis were articulated and made available to a 
wider public. The tribunal is hi-cultural in its 
mandate, its composition, and its ways of work-
ing. The educative value of its reports has been 
quite as important as the settlements it has 
recommended for the claims it has so far reported 
on. Not that its reports are to be found on the 
coffee tables of the nation. They a re directed 
primarily at a small elite of men and women who 
exercise the powers of the Crown and who are 
learning what 
it means to act 
reasonably 
and in good 
faith towards 
Maori in the 
role of the 
Treaty part-
ner. They are 
also of great 
interest to 
Ma ori tribal 
and other or-
ganisations, 
to the legal 
profession, a 
growing num-
ber of special-
ists and com-
mentators on 
Treaty issues, and to members of church and 
other voluntary organisations. They have un-
doubtedly been a positive influence on the ideas 
and attitudes of these people since 1983 and, 
through their actions, on the way public power is 
being exercised. The tribunal's leadership in ideas 
has been helped by the supportive policies of the 
fourth Labour government. And the endorsement 
by the Court of Appeal of its main fmdings has 
added greatly to its mana. 
It has become clear, indeed, that the Waitangi 
Tribunal is an institution whose time had come. 
Its active Ufe has coincided with a growing inter-
national awareness of the rights of indigenous 
peoples. Maori concems are not, as was com-
monly thought, confined to New Zealand and New 
Zealanders. They are part of a wider historical 
experience which Maori share with Australian 
Aborigines, Indians in the Americas, Inuits and 
Sami (Lapp) in the northem polar regions, and 
other indigenous peoples . All these peoples have 
had their rights trampled on by immigrant 
populations and have been reduced to a marginal 
status in their own lands. They are establishing 
their status as the flrst nations of the fourth world 
and, increasingly during the last two decades, 
they have been making common cause. The World 
Council of Indigenous Peoples was formed in 
1975. Since 1983, the UN Human Rights Com-
mission and the UN Committee on the Elimina-
tion of Racial Discrimination have become in-
creasingly active. In association with the ILO, the 
UN Working 
Group on Indig-
enous Popula-
tions has pro-
duced the Draft 
Universal Dec-
laration on the 
Rights of Indig-
enous Peoples 
which is now 
under consid-
eration by all 
UN member 
states. 
This height-
ened interna-
tional concern 
with the rights 
of indigenous 
peoples is hav-
ing a direct influence on the way the legal profes-
sion in New Zealand is beginning to think about 
Maori rights under the Treaty and in common law. 
Opinions which were orthodox for more than a 
century have been challenged by academic law-
yers who are applying new canons of scholarship 
to the origins of the Treaty in British colonial 
policy and its status in New Zealand law. Paul 
McHugh's researches have placed the Treaty in 
the context of British colonial law as it applied to 
indigenous peoples when they came under the 
British empire. David Williams has examined the 
use of law in the process of colonisation and 
argued that Maori experience had parallels else-
where in the empire, and for similar reasons. 
Frederika Hackshaw has shown how the doctrine 
of legal positivism denied a legal status to the 
Treaty and, in WiParata and later court decisions, 
deprived Maori claimants of any legal basis for 
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protecting their lights under it. Ben edict Kings bury 
has considered the Treaty in the context of devel-
oping international norms for the protection of the 
lights of indigenous peoples. 
These and similar studies are at the cutting 
edge oflegal research and commentary. McHugh's 
research, presented in evidence in hearings on the 
Kaituna claim, made a decisive impact on the 
W aitangi Tribunal. His early journal articles influ-
enced Williamson J's landmark decision in Te 
Weehi v. Regional Fisheries OJ!ker, which revised 
the judgements of more than a century in compa-
rable cases turn-
ing on Maoli fish-
ing rights. Mc-
Hugh, Williams, 
and Hackshaw 
have under-
mined Wi Parata 
and, in doing so, 
knocked away 
the central prop 
of a legal ortho-
doxy that lasted 
110 years. 
These were 
esoteric studies 
which, in another 
decade, might not have sparked any interest 
outside a small circle ofjudges, practising lawyers 
and legal historians. In the mid 1980s they made 
a vital contribution to discussions about the legal 
first principles that should be applied to the 
Treaty when considered from Maori as well as 
Pakeha perspectives. But the scholar who did 
more than any other to help New Zealanders to 
relate themselves to their bi-cultural past is the 
historian Claudia Orange, whose The Treaty of 
Waitangi was published in 1987. It achieved the 
kind of distinction usually reserved only for books 
by television chefs and sporting heroes. Not all of 
the 25,000 who have bought it, or had it given to 
them, will have read it from cover to cover. But 
sales of that order are a clear sign of a public 
hunger to be informed. Her book is to this genera-
tion what Undsay Buick's was for the fifty years 
after 1914. His was an exposition of the English 
text of the Treaty and of Pakeha sentiment about 
its place inNewZealandhistory. Claudia Orange's 
study is rooted in both texts, traces the history of 
Maori as well as Pakeha understandings, and 
explains why Maori and Pakeha have been talking 
14 STOUT CENTRE REVIEW 
past each other on treaty issues since 1840. 
Since 1987 there has been a growing spate of 
publications examining the place of the Treaty in 
contemporary New Zealand society. A notable 
feature is the number commissioned by govern-
mentdepartments and Crown agencies. The Treas-
ury 'Brief to the Incoming Government on Govern-
ment' in 1987 had an important chapter on impli-
cations of the Treaty ofW aitangi. The Royal Corn-
mission on Social Policy applied the principles of 
the treaty both in the way it conducted its enquiry 
and in its report and recommendations. The re-
port of the Royal 
Commission on 
Electoral Reform 
has valuable 
discussions of 
the electoral and 
constitutional 
implications of 
taking the treaty 
guarantees seri-
ously. The Plan-
ning Council 
held an influen-
tial seminar on 
Pakeha perspec-
tives on the 
Treaty. The Ministry of the Environment's con-
sultative processes and publications during the 
review of resource management legislation set 
new standards for the consultation of Maori opin-
ion. The Law Commission's study ofThe Treaty of 
Waitangi and Maori fisheries is a definitive ac-
count of the development of statute law on this 
vital but contentious subject. The studies ofMaori 
and the criminal justice system, conducted and 
written by Moana Jackson and published by the 
Department of Justice, raise basic questions of 
justice and equity in a bi-cultural society. 
Treaty issues are claiming more of the atten-
tion of historians and lawyers. And as the debate 
widens to encompass virtually every aspect of 
public policy it is being joined by political scien-
tists, anthropologists, sociologists, educationists 
Above: Security was stepped up for the GoveTTWr Gen-
eral in 1983. {Courtesy, New Zealand Herald) 
Opposite: Smiles ease the tension as the GoveTTWr 
General, Sir DavidBeattie, waits to receive a deputation 
from Kotahitanga on 6 February, 1984. With him are 
Hewi Tauroa and the late Sir James Henare. [Courtesy, 
New Zealand Herald[ 
and specialists in health, social welfare and in 
public policy generally. At a more popular level the 
implications of living in a hi-cultural society are 
showing in a growing interest in symbols of na-
tional identity, such as the flag, and the name by 
which the country should be identified. 
These are signs of New Zealanders searching for 
new idioms for the expression of their sense of 
national identity. Not that those seeking to speak 
with a new voice have it all their own way. The 
myth of the Treaty they are trying to exorcise has 
a life of its own 
and, because it 
answers to some 
basic notions in 
the belief system 
ofmanyPakeha, 
it still has many 
adherents. One 
example will il-
lustrate this. As 
part of its poli-
cies for devolu-
tion and the en-
hancement of 
the authority of 
Maori tribal or-
ganisations, the 
fourth Labour 
government 
sought public comment on a proposal that all 
local governing bodies should have Maori advi-
sory committees to advise on aspects of their 
responsibilities that have implications for Maori 
rights under the Treaty. Many local bodies already 
have such committees, and many of those that do 
not have one support the intent of the proposal. 
But a few opposed it, arguing that all New Zea-
landers, regardless of origin, race, colour, or creed 
should have exactly the same rights and none 
should be singled out for special treatment. 
Until less than a decade ago the monocultural 
belief that New Zealanders are 'one people' was a 
taken-for-granted Pakeha belief. New insights, 
changing attitudes, and a deeply felt desire for 
people of the two main cultures to build their 
relationships on a solid foundation of under-
standing and cultural respect are leading increas-
ing numbers of New Zealanders to prefer different 
formulations. Pakeha are learning to recognise 
the unconscious racism that has shaped their 
understanding of New Zealand history since 1840, 
the most symbolic feature of which has been the 
Treaty ofWaitangi. 
The Treaty, furthermore, exists in an English 
and a Maori version, and it is to be interpreted in 
ways that respect the different cultural perspec-
tives of its signatories. Pakeha whose 
understandings have been formed by the English 
text are discovering that articles l and 2, when 
read together, have very different cultural mean-
ings from the ones they have in the Maori text. The 
statements about kawanatanga and tino 
rangatiratanga 
are both strong. 
The object of all 
public argu-
ment about the 
Treaty, 150 
years after it 
was entered 
into, is how to 
conceive, order, 
and relate these 
separately 
sanctioned 
powers to each 
other. And the 
essential mes-
sage of the re-
cent Court of 
Appeal deci-
sions is that the Crown is not free to settle these 
matters by itself, consulting only its own con-
science. Both parties entered into the Treaty in 
good faith. Both have a right to expect the other to 
keep its promises. They are bound by the Treaty 
to deal with each other responsibly and in good 
faith. And because the Crown is one of the signa-
tories, the honour of the Crown is always involved. 
Instead, then, of being referred to as the Magna 
Carta of the Maori people, the Treaty is coming to 
be recognised as the founding document of the 
New Zealand nation. This is an essential move in 
the direction of a post-colonial mentality. 
From a seminar at the Stout Research Centre, 
which was originally presented as a paper at the 
American Ethnological Society Spring Meeting, 
Charleston, South Carolina, 1991. 
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